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Abstract
During the 1970s, under the last shah, Iran’s nuclear program seemed to be gearing up so that nation could 
gain the option of declaring weapons capability if deemed necessary and at a point when the international 
community could no longer forestall it. So re-examining activities during the Pahlavi dynasty and using 
them as a context for the Islamic Republic’s more recent actions casts light upon motivations for pursuing 
weaponization and intransigence in reaching accommodation with the West after the rise of the ayatollahs, 
despite differences between the two Iranian regimes.
 
Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program has been an ever-present vexation in Western political 
discourse since its full extent was first revealed in 2002. That December Iran confirmed it was building 
facilities to enrich uranium in addition to a heavy water reactor. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), United Nations Security Council, United States of America, European Union, and Israel have 
employed an ever-widening and steadily-strengthening combination of negotiations, sanctions, and threats 
in attempts to rein in Iran’s atomic ambitions. Yet, and the severe impact of international actions upon on 
their nation’s economy notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic’s leaders have not been persuaded to limit 
the scope of nuclear activities or grant the IAEA enhanced oversight of the program – especially not 
by mounting drumbeats threatening war.
Not always placed within the context of the Islamic Republic’s actions is that Iran’s nuclear quest began 
in 1973 while Iran was a Cold War ally of the US. The seeds had been sown more than a decade earlier, 
when the Tehran Research Reactor was provided by Washington in 1959. Then under the shah, as 
subsequently under the ayatollahs, it seems Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons capability in tandem with 
and under the guise of a civilian nuclear program. Much like the ayatollahs today, Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi denied such intentions – claiming Iran was only pursuing nuclear energy in accordance with its 
rights as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Then as now, the Iranian nuclear program seemed to be inching toward the breakout threshold, 
slowly but steadily mastering technical aspects so that its leaders would gain the option of declaring 
weapons capability if necessary and at a point when the international community could no longer forestall 
it.  So re-examining activities during the Pahlavi dynasty and placing the more recent quest by the Islamic 
Republic within a long-term context casts light upon motivation for pursuing weaponization and 
intransigence in reaching accommodation with the West after the rise of the ayatollahs, despite differences 
between the two Iranian regimes.
The Shah’s Intensions
During the 1970s just as after the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s quest to become a nuclear power was rooted 
at least partially in the regional dynamics of its location between South Asia and the Middle East. The 
shah envisioned his nuclear program as a response to atomic efforts by India, Pakistan, and Israel. He even 
hinted in June 1974 that the national security of Iran may be best served by possessing a nuclear deterrent: 
“If in this region each little country tries to arm itself with armaments that are precarious, even 
elementary, but nuclear, then perhaps the national interests of any country at all would demand it 
do the same.” The shah did add, to placate his international allies, “But I would find that completely 
ridiculous.” After all, Iran had committed itself to the NPT when that multinational agreement was 
introduced in July 1968.
Nonetheless, other nations were suspicious based on imperial Iran’s growing appetite for sophisticated 
weapons and the shah’s harkening back to the nation’s historical hegemony. So the possibility of Iran 
harboring nuclear weapons ambitions came sharply into international focus when the shah asserted that 
possibility to a French journalist in June 1974. Asked if Iran would one day possess a nuclear weapon like 
India had just one month previously, the shah declared: “Without any doubt, and sooner than one 
would think.”
Nuclear weapons require sophisticated targeting and delivery systems. At the present, with years of 
sanctions in place, the regular Iranian Navy and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
counterpart have been forced to innovate, rather successfully, in domestically enhancing maritime 
nuclear warfare capabilities. In January 1975, however, the shah sought to purchase such nuclear-
capable technology. Seeking to push through a deal for nuclear submarines from France, Iranian 
negotiators even claimed the administration in Washington had “been hinting that the U. S. might sell 
them.” US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger learned of this from French Presidential Secretary 
General Pierre Brousalette. Understandably concerned, Kissinger responded pointedly and repeatedly 
that the Iranian claim was “inconceivable … I’m 99.9% sure.” Purchasing nuclear submarines would 
violate the multi-billion dollar US-Iran arms agreement forged in May 1972 when President Richard 
Nixon allowed the shah to acquire any weapons he wished from the US short of nuclear weapons and 
associated technology.
Another warning sign was spotted in May 1975 when the shah sought to procure six battalions of Lance 
surface-to-surface missiles from Washington. The US administration under President Gerald Ford worked 
through Secretary of State Kissinger to discourage Iran’s plan because “DOD [Department of Defense] 
does not consider the Lance a cost-effective weapon when used with a conventional warhead. 
Congressional critics of our arms sales to Iran would tend to link Iran’s purchase of the Lance with 
its nuclear development plans
.” Again, the parallel with recent developments as the IRGC produces and seek to purchase missiles 
capable of carrying nuclear payloads should not be overlooked.
Undeterred by mounting international concern over his nuclear program, Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi even proposed acquiring six to eight reactors from American suppliers plus more from 
French and German companies. His stated aim was to meet domestic energy requirements through 
atomic fission thereby reserving Iran’s petrochemical wealth for export to energy-hungry foreigners
. At first glance, the proposal seemed like a win-win situation for everyone. Moreover, as the US 
government’s production of enriched nuclear fuel began reaching full capacity and plans were made to 
assemble a private sector consortium to add further capacity, the shah offered to purchase a 30 percent 
stake. The gesture was significant, as other interested parties had proven reluctant to commit significant 
funds. Iran eventually loaned US $1.18 billion to the French Atomic Energy Commission and was slated 
to acquire a 10 percent stake in the French Eurodif uranium enrichment plant. Although that stake did not 
materialize, the Islamic Republic remains an indirect investor in that uranium facility through a Franco-
Iranian consortium.
At that time during the Ford Administration (1974–1977), however, alarm in Washington over 
nuclear proliferation resulted in a provision that Tehran would have to relinquish reprocessing of 
atomic fuel to a multilateral conglomerate or allow direct American oversight within Iran. The shah 
denounced those conditions as discriminatory because Iran was a member of the NPT and therefore 
entitled to nuclear technology for civilian purposes. The situation bears an uncanny resemblance 
specifically to events in 2009 when the fuel swap proposal from the five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council and Germany failed to win Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s approval and 
broadly to the vexed history of failed attempts at nuclear safeguards for Iran.
The IAEA, US, and EU estimate that the Islamic Republic’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium
far exceeds needs of the Tehran medical research reactor for many years to come. Likewise, during the 
Ford Administration, the US Department of State reported that the shah’s planned nuclear-based 
electricity generating capacity of 23,000 megawatts went well beyond all projections of Iran’s domestic 
energy needs. The report therefore concluded that Iran’s motives were “not entirely clear” and seemed to 
be propelled at least in part by a desire to develop nuclear weapons. As a result, negotiations continued to 
falter over the reprocessing issue until President Jimmy Carter reached a provisional agreement on the 
issue with the shah in 1978.
Yet, whether the shah would have honored the agreement will never be known for he was overthrown the 
following year. US cooperation with Iran on nuclear and other issues was halted with the revolution in 
1979 that established the Islamic Republic. It is likely, however, that Iran would have ended up 
confronting the West generally and the US specifically over its nuclear program even if the shah had 
remained on the throne and continued to be an American ally. Indeed, the shah’s thinly-masked quest for 
nuclear power was apparent to officials who served him, even as Western governments remained 
uncertain of the end game just as they seem to be with the ayatollahs. Minister of Court Asadollah Alam 
wrote in his diary on 29 November 1975 that the shah’s scheme “though he denies it, probably includes 
our manufacturing of a nuclear deterrent.” Akbar Etemad, the shah’s chief atomic energy adviser, was 
more definitive about the quest atomic weapons when interviewed after the Pahlavi dynasty had been 
ousted: “I always suspected that part of the shah's plan was to build [nuclear] bombs.”
The Ayatollahs’ Aims
Having experienced colossal military and civilian causalities during the Iraq-instigated border war from 
1980 and 1988, Iran’s leadership concluded that survival of their nation and regime were paramount. Like 
the shah before them, the ayatollahs turned to a nuclear program in the hope of assuaging those concerns. 
After the Islamic Republic reluctantly agreed to termination of hostilities with Iraq, Ayatollah Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani laid the groundwork for the nuclear program’s recommencement. Even religious 
ideals which regarded nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as haram or prohibited were cast 
aside. Speaking to the IRGC in October 1988, while serving as Speaker of Parliament, Rafsanjani 
advocated developing weapons of mass destruction “because the need for such armaments was made 
very clear during the [Iran-Iraq] war … [so] we should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive 
and defense use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons.”  For a similar statement see 
this.
Once a political consensus had been achieved in late 1988, Mohsen Rezai who commanded the IRGC, and 
subsequently served as Secretary of the Expediency Guidance Council, wrote to then Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini requesting both religious acquiescence and administrative permission 
for the revolutionary guards to initiate a nuclear weapons program. Mir Hossein Mousavi who 
served as Prime Minister from 1981 to 1989 supported the request by Rezai and the campaign by 
Rafsanjani. Although Supreme Leader Khomeini had initially been opposed to the atom’s might, they 
were able to sway Iran’s revolutionary founder into agreeing that “We have nothing against setting up 
atomic installations” (p. 17). So the Islamic Republic commenced fledgling steps toward nuclear power.
Subsequently as two-term president of Iran from 1989 to 1997, Rafsanjani ensured Iran fully resumed its 
quest toward nuclearization. His presidential successors Seyyed Mohammad Khatami who held office 
from 1997 to 2005 and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who has been in office since 2005 continued the energy 
and weapon programs set up by Rafsanjani, Rezai, and Mousavi. Khatami did suspend uranium 
enrichment in 2003 hoping to improve relations with the US, but legislative elections in 2004 saw 
resurgence of hardliners on the Iranian political scene and a recommitment to atomic goals. (See this, this, 
and this). Over the next two decades the Islamic Republic turned not only to its pre-revolutionary 
technology but also to foreign sources including A. Q. Khan’s illicit Pakistan-based network, North 
Korea, and the People’s Republic of China as it steadily built-up domestic nuclear capacity.
On the political and ideological fronts, a convergence of self-preservation, nationalism, and suspicion 
of the West leads many Iranian leaders to embrace nuclear ambitions. Iranians bear a deeply entrenched 
pride in their nation, heritage, achievements, and independence. The ayatollahs and other politicians know 
most Iranians will feel great pride in achieving atomic status, reservations on the wisdom of such power 
notwithstanding. Even beyond the circles of high power, many middle-level Iranian bureaucrats, 
intellectuals, and ordinary citizens whose ideas and ideals were shaped by the Islamic Revolution with its 
anti-Western sentiments are convinced that the US and EU “seek to dominate Iran.” They view nuclear 
capability as a deterrent to neo-colonialism.
Not surprisingly, Iranians who ascribe to nuclear power point to events involving the other two countries 
labeled parts of the “axis of evil,” believing that nuclear power saved North Korea from the fate that befell 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The ouster of Muammar Qaddafi, after he gave up nuclear weapons, by NATO 
and US forces providing assistance to Libyan rebels, reinforced their disposition that atomic capacity acts 
as a safeguard. So those individuals readily accept the ideas of militant ayatollahs like Mohammad Taghi 
Mesbah Yazdi who propose that Iran should “not deprive itself of the right to produce special weapons
.” Consequently, even an influential Iranian philosopher Mohsen Gharavian has come to regard nuclear 
weapons as “a natural countermeasure,” adding that “in the name of self-defense [any nation] has 
the right to have and to use weapons of mass destruction.”
Hence, like the Pahlavi dynast before it, the Islamic Republic of Iran is unlikely to abandon either 
nuclear power or the possibility of weaponization. Indeed, negative responses to Ahmadinejad’s 
attempt to reach a nuclear fuel swap deal with the West in late 2009 are highly instructive. “The 
discussions in Geneva were really surprising … the hard work of thousands of [our] scientists would 
be ruined,” Mousavi critiqued. Unsuccessful presidential candidate Seyyed Mehdi Karroubi accused 
Ahmadinejad’s administration of “trying to change its policies” rather than “observing national and 
religious interests.” Not to be outdone by other politicians, Iran’s Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani 
claimed that “Westerners are insisting in a direction that suggests cheating us out of our nuclear 
rights.” Sensing the overall pro-nuclear sentiment within his administration, Supreme Leader Khamenei 
then expressed distain for compromise: “When we carefully look at the situation, we notice that they 
[the U.S. and its allies] are hiding a dagger behind their back.”
Present Mimics the Past with Graver Dangers
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently denied it seeks anything more than 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But Supreme Leader Khamenei’s unconvincing words that “We do 
not have nuclear weapons, and we do not intend to produce them,” are reminiscent of those by the last 
shah and his diplomats that “Iran is not thinking of building atomic weapons.” Such statements are 
directed at defusing the brewing storm in Washington, London, and Jerusalem rather than for domestic 
policy-makers. Indeed just as Khamenei has threatened repeatedly in recent years that “Iran will respond 
with the same and greater levels of power,” the shah’s regime too left open possibly assembling nuclear 
warheads by claiming “the regime may revise its policy if other non-nuclear nations do.” There is an 
essential difference in such rhetoric, however, for the shah was not threating the US, EU, Saudi Arabia, 
Israel, or any other nation with preemptive or retaliatory attacks nor sponsoring terrorism. So unlike the 
shah, much of the pressure Iran faces is a direct consequence of the confrontational positions taken by its 
leaders.
Nuclear weapons fitted well with the shah’s ideas of deterring external adversaries and strengthening his 
hold on power at home, just as similar ideas motivate the ayatollahs who run the Islamic Republic to 
continue enhancing their nuclear program. If the shah’s pattern of obfuscation between 1973 and 1979 is 
any indicator, it is unlikely that Iran’s current leaders will meet NPT obligations – even at great socio-
economic cost to their citizens and fever-pitch global consternation. Worse, unlike the royal regime whose 
tyranny inside Iran set a model for that of the Shi‘ite clergymen, the Islamic Republic has come to be 
associated with threats and violence beyond its borders directed against nations and persons perceived as 
foes of theocratic rule. Moreover, unlike the shah, the Muslim theocrats who govern seek to export their 
intolerant brand of fundamentalism to other nations with an avowed goal of “leading the world.” Equally 
problematic, they speak of “sharing nuclear knowledge and technology” – thereby further undermining 
the NPT and possibly even global stability.
For the ayatollahs who hold power by force at home and seek to dominate the world stage through terror 
abroad, nuclear weapons would serve as the ultimate deterrent against punitive consequences, 
international adversaries, and externally-imposed regime change. Consequently, as the shah did in the 
1970s, Iran’s current leaders undoubtedly view acquisition of nuclear technology as a self-servingly 
rational decision even at the expense of alienating Iran from other countries. Such tendencies are 
reinforced in the Iranian mindset – whether that of the shah or the ayatollahs – by external calls for 
preemptive, even surgical, strikes against Iran’s nuclear program although such action may be seen as 
unavoidable, necessary, and as a last resort, after years of failed negotiations by the West.
Much debate ensues in Western intelligence, foreign policy, and military circles as to whether Iran’s 
current leaders have decided to manufacture nuclear weapons, how long it would take their scientists to 
assemble even one warhead, and the capabilities of their delivery systems. But one aspect is clear: Like 
the shah before them, the ayatollahs are taking the necessary steps to ensure they have the technology and 
materials in place to become a nuclear-armed nation if and when they decide to cross the breakout 
threshold. “We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing 
various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We 
do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons,” noted even the 
2012 Worldwide Threat Assessment report from the US Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. (See also Institute for Science and International Security, Foreign Affairs, World 
Affairs Journal, and Reuters).
Western nations, like Iran’s Arab and Israeli neighbors, were wary of the shah’s motives. More than three 
decades later they have become downright fearful of the ayatollahs’ intentions because of the ayatollahs 
belligerent stances. After all, even the US with its formidable military resources may only be able to set 
back Iran’s nuclear plans by a few years. The basic dilemma confronting nations that seek to halt the 
Islamic Republic’s progress toward atomic power is that rational choices do not always indicate 
levelheaded decision-makers. Like the shah before them, the ayatollahs resort to political paranoia on 
the domestic and international fronts as part of their rationale for espousing nuclear technology. 
Yet unlike the shah’s program coming to a halt through regime change, those opposed to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran reaching and crossing the nuclear threshold cannot place hope on a new government 
emerging in Tehran anytime in the near future.  (See Foreign Policy, World Policy Journal, and World 
Politics Review.)
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